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COMMENT

SANCTIONS IN THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT POWER
Stephen B. Burbank*
The most recent proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure1 present interesting questions from the perspective of
Copyright 0 1983 by Stephen B. Burbank
* Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1968,
J.D. 1973, Harvard University. This is a revised version of remarks delivered to the Civil
Procedure Section at the 1983 annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools.
1. A June 1981 preliminary draft of the proposed amendments was published for comment. PreliminaryDraft of Proposed Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,
90 F.R.D. 451 (1981) [hereinafter cited as PreliminaryDraft]. Public hearings were held in
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 16, 1981) and in Los Angeles (Nov. 6, 1981). See id. at 451,454. The
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules submitted its final draft of the proposed amendments
(other than the proposed amendments to Rules 4 and 45, which were treated separately) to the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure on March 9, 1982. Advisory Committee's Final Draft of Proposed Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure (Mar.
9, 1982) (copy on file with the Hofstra Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Final Draft]. After
making changes, the Standing Committee recommended that the proposed amendments be
approved by the Judicial Conference. See letter from Hon. Walter R. Mansfield to Joseph F.
Spaniol (June 30, 1982) (copy on file with the Hofstra Law Review); letter from Hon. Edward
T. Gignoux to Joseph F. Spaniol (July 14, 1982) (copy on file with the Hofstra Law Review);
Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 86 (Sept. 22-23,
1982) [hereinafter cited as Proceedings]. The Conference approved the proposed amendments
with minor changes at its September 1982 meeting and transmitted them to the Supreme
Court. See id.
On April 28, 1983, the Court adopted the proposed amendments, effective August 1,
1983, and authorized the Chief Justice to transmit them to Congress. 51 U.S.L.W. 4501 (U.S.
May 3, 1983). See AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIvIL PROCEDURE FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT
COURTS, H.R. Doc. No. 54, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-25 (1983) [hereinafter cited as SUPREME
COURT REPORT]. The proposed Rules as approved by the Judicial Conference, together with
the Advisory Committee's Notes and forms are printed in id. at 35-84; see also 97 F.R.D. 165244 (1983).
For the fate of the proposed amendment to Rule 4, see Act of Aug. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-227, 96 Stat. 246 (delaying effective date); Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96
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the jurisprudence of court rulemaking. That is a perspective which,
except as to matters of rulemaking process and structure, has been
largely neglected, 2 and it has not informed the discussion of the most
controversial of the proposed amendments, those dealing with
sanctions.
The 1980 amendments, we well remember, were criticized in
high places as a "compromise" and as "tinkering changes."3 AlStat. 2527 (enacting an amendment to Rule 4). See also Siegel, Practice Commentary on
Amendment of Federal Rule 4 (Eff. Feb. 26, 1983) with Special Statute of Limitations Precautions, 96 F.R.D. 88 (1983).
2. See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1018-23,
1193-97 (1982). For suggested changes in the court rulemaking process, see W. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND PossIBILITiEs 41-63, 118-34 (1981). For proposals as to
structural alternatives, see id. at 64-86, 108-17. In February, 1982, the House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association approved principles to "promote openness in the rule-making
process" that included publishing rulemaking procedures, publishing and distributing draft
rules and major changes therein, holding public hearings on draft rules and major changes,
maintaining publicly available minutes of proceedings, and taking action on final reports on
proposed rules at open meetings. See SUMMARY OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 9-10 (1982). The House of Delegates also approved changes in the relevant statutes and procedures so as to delegate rulemaking authority
to the Judicial Conference and to make the Conference's Advisory Committees "broadly representative of all segments of the legal profession .... Id. at 9. The long-ago promised formal
statement of rulemaking procedures from the Judicial Conference's Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, see Burbank, supra, at 1021 n.17, has yet to appear. The
chairman of that committee, Judge Gignoux, has, however, testified at a hearing on the federal
court rulemaking process held by the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee on April 21, 1983. Copies of Judge
Gignoux's statement and of the statements of James F. Holderman (on behalf of the ABA)
and Alan B. Morrison (Director, Public Citizen Litigation Group) are on file with the Hofstra
Law Review.
One matter of court rulemaking jurisprudence that, in light of the proposed amendments,
can no longer be neglected concerns the relationship between supervisory court rules and local
court rules. The proposed amendments explicitly permit local rulemaking on some matters, see

proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b), SUPREME COURT REPORT, supra note I,at 5 (categories of
cases may be exempted from scheduling order requirement); id. at 5-6 (magistrate may be
authorized to enter (and modify) scheduling order), and the Advisory Committee Notes elsewhere state that local experimentation is permitted. See proposed FED. R. CIv. P. 16 advisory
committee note, SUPREME COURT REPORT, supra note 1, at 52 (responsibility for drafting
pretrial order). The rulemakers' criteria in making these judgments are not clear, nor are the
implications of this greater specificity about local court rulemaking for other areas where it is
lacking. How, for instance, can a local rule limiting the number of interrogatories be upheld
under 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976) (I pretermit FED. R. Civ. P. 83, which in my view is invalid,
see Burbank, supra, at 1193 n.763), given the Committee's 1980 decision to withdraw an
amendment to FED. R. CIv. P. 33(a) that would have blessed such rules, a decision supported
by reference to "[t]he constantly-echoed criticism . . . that a limitation on the number of
questions was arbitrary, unreasonable and unnecessary"? H.R. Doc. No. 306, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 18 (1980).
3. 446 U.S. 995, 998, 1000 (1980) (dissenting statement of Powell, J.). We may not
remember that "tinkering" by state legislatures was one of the rallying cries in the campaign
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though compromise also appears to have played a part in the proposed amendments,4 their emphasis on sanctions represents no mere
tinkering. To be sure, sanctions for a willful violation of Rule 11 and
for various defaults in connection with discovery were part of the
original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 Moreover, at least since
Professor Rosenberg's influential 1958 article,' sanctions have been
an important item on the agenda of those concerned about discovery
abuse. Sanctions received attention in the 1970 Amendments7 and
again in the 1980 Amendments. 8 But, with these proposed amendments, they have moved center-stage. The rulemakers propose: sanctions for violation of the certification requirement imposed by proposed Rule 11 for pleadings, motions and other papers,9 sanctions for
for federal legislation authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure in civil
actions at law, see Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure,6 A.B.A. J. 509,
513 (1920) ("[c]onstant unscientific legislation"), as well as in the national campaign for procedural reform, see, e.g., Clark, Code Pleadingand PracticeToday in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD:
CENTENARY ESSAYS 55, 61-63 (A. Reppy ed. 1949) ("Code Tinkering in New York"). Moreover, Dean Clark, the Reporter of the original Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, adduced
the spectre of congressional "tinkering" in arguing against an interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 that would require the submission of amendments to Congress. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1153 n.601.
Now that the rulemaking process has been more closely assimilated to the legislative process and may become even more closely assimilated, see supra notes 1 & 2, and in light of the
speed with which these proposed amendments follow the 1980 amendments, is there reason to
fear that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will become a latter day Throop Code? On the
Throop Code, see Clark, supra, at 62.
4. Thus, the preliminary draft of proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) required "the judge"
to enter a scheduling order, Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 466, and the Advisory Committee Note made clear that the choice of language was deliberate, reflecting the Committee's
"judgment that it is preferable that this task should be handled by a district judge rather than
a magistrate, except when the magistrate is acting under 28 U.S.C. § 636." Id. at 472. In
response to objections by federal magistrates, the Advisory Committee changed the language
in its final draft to permit entry of a scheduling order by a magistrate "only when specifically
authorized by district court rule .... " See, e.g., Comments of the National Association of
United States Magistrates (Oct. 10, 1981) (copy on file with the Hofstra Law Review); Final
Draft, supra note 1, at 9. The Standing Committee added language to enable a magistrate to
modify a schedule "when specifically authorized by district court rule." See letter from Hon.
Walter R. Mansfield to Joseph F. Spaniol, supra note 1. The words "only" and "specifically"
in proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) were deleted by the Judicial Conference. See Proceedings,
supra note 1, at 86; SUPREME COURT REPORT, supra note 1, at 42. See also id. at 5-6.
5. See 308 U.S. 645, 676 (1937) (Rule 11); id. at 704 (Rule 30(g)); id. at 710-13 (Rule
37) see also id. at 736 (Rule 56(g)).
6. Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 480
(1958).
7. See 398 U.S. 977 (1970).
8. See 446 U.S. 995 (1980).
9. Proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 11 provides in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has
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failure to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, for failure to appear
at, to be prepared to participate in, or to participate in good faith in,
a conference, under proposed Rule 16,10 and sanctions for violation
of the certification requirement imposed by proposed Rule 26 for discovery requests, responses and objections."
read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken
unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the
pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person
who signed. it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
SUPREME CouRT REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-5.
10. Proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f) provides:
(f) SANCTIONS. If a party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or
pretrial order, or if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or
pretrial conference, or if a party or party's attorney is substantially unprepared to
participate in the conference, or if a party or party's attorney fails to participate in
good faith, the judge, upon motion or his own initiative, may make such orders with
regard thereto as are just, and among others any of the orders provided in Rule
37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of or in addition to any other sanction, the judge shall
require the party or the attorney representing him or both to pay the reasonable
expenses incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, including attorney's
fees, unless the judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
SUPREME COURT REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
11. Proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) provides:
(g) SIGNING OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS, RESPONSES, AND OBJECTIONS. Every request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a
party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in
his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party whois not represented
by an attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and state his address.
The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that he has read the
request, response, or objection, and that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the
case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or objection
is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is
called to the attention of the party making the request, response or objection and a
party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is signed.
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I will not rehearse-although I will touch on some of-the prudential arguments of those who favor and those who oppose enhanced emphasis on sanctions as a means to meet and deter perceived abuses in the conduct of civil litigation. My concern, rather,
has to do with questions of power. The analysis is offered with no
pretensions to definitiveness. It may, however, stimulate further
thought about questions that, it seems to me, have received inadequate attention in the past.
In the Note to proposed Rule 11, the Advisory Committee, after
observing that "in practice Rule 11 has not been effective in deterring abuses" and that the courts have been reluctant to impose sanctions, states:
The amended rule attempts to deal with the problem by building upon and expanding the equitable doctrine permitting the court
to award expenses, including attorney's fees, to a litigant whose opponent acts in bad faith in instituting or conducting litigation. See,
e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,447 U.S. 752 (1980); Hall v.
Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).12

In the Note to proposed Rule 26, the Committee states:
Because of the asserted reluctance to impose sanctions on attorneys who abuse the discovery rules, . . . Rule 26(g) makes explicit the authority judges now have to impose appropriate sanctions and requires them to use it. This authority derives from Rule
37, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the court's inherent power. See Roadway. . . Martin v. Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.R.D. 654, 661-62 (D.
Col. 1980); Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who
Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 619 (1977).13
In one Note, the Committee acknowledges that the proposed
amendment represents an expansion of existing authority. In the
other, it asserts that the proposed amendment merely codifies existing authority and requires the courts to exercise it. The apparent
If a certification is made inviolation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party
on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate

sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
SUPREME COURT REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-11.
12. Proposed FED. R. Cxv. P. 11 advisory committee note, SUPREME COURT REPORT,

supra note 1, at 38.
13. Proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee note, SUPREME COURT REPORT,
supra note 1, at 60.
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inconsistency suggests a need to examine the extent to which the
Committee's proposed sanction provisions are, in fact, restatements
of existing authority, and to the extent they are not, whether they
pose any serious questions of power.
I am uneasy whenever, as in the Advisory Committee Note to
proposed Rule 26, I encounter a defense of an assertion of power
predicated on multiple sources of authority. My uneasiness is conditioned generally in the context of supervisory court rulemaking by an
awareness, based on historical research, that the Advisory Committee has not often been overly troubled by questions of power. 4 Indeed, the Reporter of the 1938 Civil Rules, then Dean Clark, once
wrote an article, based on a memorandum he had prepared for the
Advisory Committee, in which he traced the authority to deal with
matters of procedure affecting appeals to a variety of sources.15 He
later noted to a correspondent that Professor Moore had "always
laughed slyly at [that] article on the basis that there I did much
rewriting of the Act. I have answered that some one must do it and
that I was affording a logical basis therefor.""
Proposed Rule 26(g) requires every attorney or unrepresented
party to sign every discovery request, response or objection and provides that the signature constitutes an elaborate certification calling
for, among other things, an exercise of judgment about such matters
as the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the
amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in
the litigation. The proposed Rule also provides that if a certification
is made in violation of the Rule, the-court shall impose an appropriate sanction that may include reasonable expenses incurred because
of the violation, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 7 To what extent does this provision regarding sanctions "make explicit the authority judges now have"?
In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,'8 the Court considered three
14. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1132-37, 1194.
15. For the article, see Clark, Power of the Supreme Court to Make Rules of Appellate
Procedure, 49 HARv. L. REV. 1303 (1936). The memorandum, dated February 2, 1936, can
be found in 2 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (Harvard Law School Library), See
also Burbank, supra note 2, at 1138 n.545.
16. Letter from Charles E. Clark to Edgar B. Tolman (Oct. 15, 1938) (extract with
letter from Charles E. Clark to Monte M. Lemann (Nov. 1, 1938) (Charles E. Clark Papers,
Yale University Library, box 113, folder 65)).
17. See supra note 11.
18. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
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possible sources of authority for the district court's order that counsel for the plaintiffs pay more than $17,000 in costs and attorney's
fees to the defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 192719 was found not to authorize
an award of attorney's fees. 20 The Court upheld the "inherent
power" of a trial court to award attorney's fees in certain circumstances but defined those circumstances as necessarily including conduct that constitutes or is tantamount to bad faith, as to which there
was no specific finding.2 1 Finally, the Court invited the district court
on remand to consider whether to award costs and attorney's fees for
failure to answer Roadway Express' interrogatories under Rule
37(b). 2
Now, since the Court's decision in Roadway Express, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 has been amended to include the sanction of attorney's fees.23
The statutory amendment should not, however, provide comfort
to-indeed, it should discomfort-the rulemakers. The proposed
amendment to Rule 26 (as with proposed Rule 11) provides sanctions that may include a reasonable attorney's fee without requiring
conduct that was willful, in bad faith, or the like. 4 In amending
section 1927, on the other hand, Congress specifically declined to
alter the standard under existing law, described by Representative
Mazzoli as requiring "the attorney conduct, if sanctionable, to be
solely for the purpose of delay .... -25 As he explained: "The managers on the part of the House were firm in their resolve to maintain
the tough standard of current law so that the legislation in no way
would dampen the legitimate zeal of an attorney in representing his
client. 16 Representative McClory observed that the House conferees
19. "Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United
States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case as to increase
costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally such

excess costs." 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976). The statute has since been amended. See infra text
accompanying note 23.

20.
21.
22.
23.

447 U.S. at 757-63.
Id. at 764-67.
Id. at 764.
The current version reads:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (Supp. V 1982).
24.
25.
26.

See supra notes 9, 11.
126 CONG. REc. H8047 (daily ed. Aug. 28, 1980).
Id.
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were unable to accept the Senate standard (which required a finding
that the attorney "intentionally engage[d] in conduct unreasonably
and primarily for the purpose of delaying or increasing the cost of
the litigation") 27 because it "would have lowered the standard of dilatory conduct necessary to make out a violation and would have
done so to such an extent that

. . .

the legitimate zeal of attorneys

representing their clients would have been chilled." 2 In other words,
the amendment to section 1927 changed the extent of liability of an
attorney found in violation. Query, however, whether in light of the
policy judgments made by Congress, that is all it did,2 9 a question to
which I shall return. In any event, the amended statute by itself
hardly provides authority for the expansive approach to sanctions
taken in the proposed amendments.
What of the "court's inherent power"? Here, we immediately
encounter a problem of definition that has eluded or bedeviled many
courts and commentators for years.30 The Advisory Committee may
27. S. 390, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1979), 125 CONG. REC. 19,916 (1979). See also
S. REP. No. 238, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, 9-10 (1979).
28. 126 CONG. REC. H8048 (daily ed. Aug. 28, 1980). See also H.R. REP. No. 1234,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (Conference Report), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2781, 2782 [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT].
29. [W]e chose not to alter the standard of conduct required by present law. What
we did change was the extent of liability to be imposed on attorneys who engage in
clearly dilatory tactics. . . . The extent of this liability cannot, in justice, be limited
merely to filing fees and other nominal court costs as it is today. But it should
extend to out-of-pocket costs that the opposition had to incur for legal fees and
witness expenses because of the attorney's misconduct. This is what our compromise
does-this is all it does, and I believe that it should be accepted by this body.
126 CONG. REc. H8048 (daily ed. Aug. 28, 1980) (statement of Rep. McClory).
30. For assistance in penetrating the rhetoric of inherent judicial power, see Frankfurter
& Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "'Inferior"Federal
Courts-A Study in Separationof Powers, 37 HARV. L. REv. 1010 (1924); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over JudicialRule-Making: A Problem of ConstitutionalRevision,
107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 29-33 (1958); Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court
Affecting Procedure,22 WASH. U.L.Q. 459 (1937). See also Burbank, supra note 2, at 1021
n.19, 1115 n.455, 1183 n.728.
Apart from failing to distinguish between judicial power to act in the absence of contrary
legislative direction and power to act notwithstanding such direction, the problem discussed in
the text, commentators are too quick to find assertions of inherent power in judicial opinions.
Take, for instance, Hecker v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123 (1865) (The date of decision and
the proper case caption can be found in 17 Law. Ed. 759. The error in the official report was
confirmed by the Court's Reporter of Decisions on March 25, 1983.), where the Court stated:
"Circuit courts, as well as all other Federal courts, have authority to make and establish all
necessary rulesfor the orderly conductingbusiness in the said courts,provided such rules are
not repugnant to the laws of the United States." Id. at 128 (emphasis added). The case is
cited for the proposition that the federal courts possess inherent power to make rules. See, e.g.,
R. RoDES, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FED-

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol11/iss3/4

8

Burbank: Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civi
19831

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

be no exception, if the serial citation of Roadway Express and Hall
v. Cole"1 in the Note to proposed Rule 11 was intended to suggest
that these cases stand for the same proposition. 2 In Hall, the Court
was discussing an equitable doctrine that, as the opinion itself
pointed out, is within the power of Congress to reverse. 3 In Roadway Express, on the other hand, the Court was discussing a power
that is inherent in the sense that it trumps a contrary determination
by Congress. It is for that reason that the Court observed: "Because
inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, they
must be exercised with restraint and discretion. ' 34 Indeed, apparently preoccupied with the specific context (attorney's fees), the
Court opined that "a specific finding as to whether counsel's conduct
. . . constituted or was tantamount to bad faith

. .

would have to

35
precede any sanction under the court's inherent powers."1
It may not be fair to tax the Advisory Committee with perpetuating confusion about the concept of inherent power, both because its
citation to Hall occurs in the Note to proposed Rule 11 and the
specific reference to "the court's inherent power" occurs in the Note
to proposed Rule 26, and because the Court itself was confused in
Roadway Express, relying on cases such as Hall and Alyeska Pipeline Service v. Wilderness Society,"6 cases involving judicial power
indisputably subject to congressional override,3 7 for the content of a
judicial power "shielded from direct democratic controls." Again,
however, the inherent power concept, at least as blessed by the Su-

181 n.473 (1981); Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 374, 396 n.80 (1982); Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse
the JudicialProcess, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 619, 633 (1977). Of course, even if the Court had
been asserting inherent power, it was power subject to congressional override. But the Court
was not asserting any inherent power at all. Rather, it was, in the italicized language, directly
quoting the Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83. See also Burbank, supra note 2,
at 1115 n.455.
31. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
32. See supra text accompanying note 12.
33. "This does not end our inquiry, however, for even where 'fee-shifting' would be appropriate as a matter of equity, Congress has the power to circumscribe such relief." 412 U.S.
at 9.
34. 447 U.S. at 764.
35. Id. at 767 (emphasis added). Although this dictum may be defensible, its origins, see
infra text accompanying notes 36-37, provide grounds for skepticism. One might have hoped
for greater "restraint and discretion" in the articulation of the doctrine of inherent power.
36. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
37. See supra text accompanying note 33; see also 421 U.S. at 259 ("These exceptions
are unquestionably assertions of inherent power in the courts to allow attorneys' fees in particular situations, unless forbidden by Congress .... ").
ERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
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preme Court in Roadway Express, hardly supports, by itself, the
breadth of the sanction provisions in these proposed amendments.
We are remitted then to the Advisory Committee's reliance on
Rule 37 and can now better understand its citation, in the Note to
proposed Rule 26, of a student piece in the University of Chicago
Law Review, where the author concludes: "[T]he great advantage of
sanctions entered pursuant to the courts' rulemaking power is that
negligent or reckless conduct can clearly be sufficient for liability."' a
There is no question that provisions of Rule 37 in its present form
authorize the imposition of sanctions, including attorney's fees, for
conduct that does not rise to the level of bad faith and that is not as
egregious as conduct triggering 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 81 The inquiry then
is whether such provisions are a valid exercise of the rulemaking
power, an inquiry that requires us to consider the Rules Enabling
Act of 1934.40

For purposes of simplicity, it may be useful to phrase two questions: (1) Does the Supreme Court have the power under the Rules
Enabling Act to promulgate rules that authorize the imposition of
sanctions, including reasonable attorney's fees, on parties or their attorneys for conduct that is negligent (or, if you like, non-willful, not
in bad faith, or whatever similar formulation is necessary to remove
the proposed amendments from any protective umbrella of section
1927 and inherent power as defined in Roadway Express)? (2) Does
the Supreme Court have the power under the Act to promulgate
rules that require the imposition of sanctions in those circumstances?
I believe the answer to the first question is affirmative, although that
answer is not reached without difficulty. An affirmative answer to the
second question requires the surmounting of even greater difficulties.
As long as Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.41 remains law and the
Court that promulgates Federal Rules and amendments has the final
word on their validity,4 2 disputations regarding validity and invalid38. Note, supra note 30, at 636. For the Committee's citation, see supra text accompanying note 13. The Note otherwise contains a number of impediments to citation, including the
attribution to Congress of the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
at 632 ("Congress not only added these two provisions .

. . ."). See

also supra note 30.

39. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4), (b), (c) & (d). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 30(g). But
see FED. R. Civ. P. 37(g) (requiring failure "to participate in good faith").
40. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1976)).
41. 312 U.S. 1 (1941). Sibbach has not been repudiated. See Burbank, supra note 2, at
1023.
42. See W. BROWN, supra note 2, at 75-78; see also Burbank, supra note 2, at 1129
n.515, 1134 n.530, 1137. There are suggestions that the Chief Justice, at least, is disposed to
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ity are likely to be of purely academic interest, and the remedy, if
any, to overreaching will come by Way of congressional action. As
one who has recently penned many pages of academic disputation on
the subject,4s I will hardly shirk an opportunity for a brief refrain
particularly because, for reasons not unrelated to those germane in a
doctrinal analysis, there is some basis for prediction that Congress,
given its willingness since 1973 to intercept proposed Federal Rules
and amendments, 44 will show an interest in these.
Historical research suggests that Congress' purpose in the
4 was to allocate lawmakfamous first two sentences of the 1934 ActO5
ing power between federal institutions, the Supreme Court (as
rulemaker) and Congress, and that the protection of state law was
deemed a likely effect, rather than the primary purpose, of the procedure/substance dichotomy. Moreover, the history tells us that
Congress intended significantly greater limitations on rulemaking
than the Court has acknowledged-either implicitly in promulgating
Federal Rules and amendments or explicitly in cases adjudicating
their validity. Briefly, Congress' concerns seem to have been
rulemaking in areas where choices would have a predictable and
identifiable impact on rights claimed under the substantive law or on
interests claimed under the Constitution, and rulemaking in areas
where choices would create rights substantially similar to rights
47
under the substantive law in their effect on persons or property.
Of course, a sanction-the sanction of arrest for contempt in
failing to obey an order to submit to a physical examination-was
central to the Court's decision, although not to the parties' arguments, in the Sibbach case.48 Moreover, in the pre-1934 legislative
materials that inform the interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act,
there is evidence of particular concern about arrest, probably bedisengage the Court from rule promulgation. See id. at 1021 n.16, 1195-96. The principles
approved by the ABA's House of Delegates in 1982 call for transfer of the Court's functions to
the Judicial Conference. See supra note 2.
43.

Burbank, supra note 2.

44. See id. at 1018-20.
45. "[Tlhe Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to prescribe, by
general rules . . . the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and
procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the
substantive rights of any litigant." Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, § 1, 48 Stat.
1064, 1064. For the subsequent history of the Act, see Burbank, supra note 2, at 1101-04.
46.

See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1106-12.

47. See id. at 1121-31.
48.

See Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14, 16 (1941); Burbank, supra note 2, at 1181-
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cause of its equivalence in the bill's sponsors' minds with a rule of
substantive law."9 In any event, the Court's convoluted reasoning
about Rule 37 in Sibbach aside, 50 that rule is valid even with respect
to the sanction of arrest for contempt precisely because it makes no
choices. 51
We need not be concerned about the sanction of arrest (for contempt) in connection with the proposed amendments to Rules 11 and
26, because the trial judge retains discretion to choose from a range
of available sanctions. 2 What then is the problem? As I see it, the
problem is this: In the legislative history of the amendments to 28
U.S.C. § 1927, Congress itself identified as a concern the effect of
alternative choices among standards for imposing sanctions on the
"legitimate zeal" of attorneys in representing their clients.5 3 In other
words, it was not the sanction to be imposed-Congress agreed that
the range of sanctions should be augmented-but the conduct triggering the imposition that was of concern. Moreover, Congress apparently believed that judgments about the effect of alternative sanctioning standards on lawyers' conduct (and, implicitly, on their
clients' cases) could be made with some confidence.
Even with the gloss provided by this legislative history, I do not
maintain that the proposed amendments are invalid under the standards emerging from the Rules Enabling Act's pre-1934 history. For
accepting, as I do not, Congress' judgment about the predictability
of impact of choices among different sanctioning standards, that impact is not identifiable in any particular class of cases.5 The
rulemakers have not, however, aided their case by supplementing one
rulemaking choice with another, that is, by making the imposition of
sanctions mandatory upon a finding of violation.
The proposed amendments to Rules 11 and 26 differ from the
49.

See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1121-22, 1124, 1128.

50. See Id. at 1181-82.
51.

See id. at 1184. More generally, "[t]o the extent that a Federal Rule makes no

choices or makes a choice the consequences of which are defeasible by operation of another
Federal Rule, the argument for invalidity under [the standards derived from the Act's pre1934 history] appears to be weakened considerably." Id. at 1193 (footnote omitted).
Of course, FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) does not permit the trial court to treat failure to obey an
order to submit to a physical or mental examination as a contempt of court. The counterpart
involved in Sibbach, see 312 U.S. at 9, authorized, except in such cases, "an order directing

the arrest of any party or agent of a party for disobeying any of such orders .
Burbank, supra note 2, at 1181 n.718.
52.

See

See supra notes 9, 11.

53. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
54.

Cf. Burbank, supra note 2, at 1129-30 (evidence), 1183 (discovery).
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provisions of Rule 37 in at least one significant respect: The proposed
amendments require the court to impose sanctions upon violation of
the respective certification requirements, whereas Rule 37 affords
discretion, even though at first blush there does not appear to be
any.55 In this aspect, the proposed amendments do not, and do not
purport to, find any support in Rule 37 or in the other sources of
authority relied on: (1) An inflexible requirement to impose sanctions is the antithesis of the equitable doctrine referred to in the Advisory Committee Note to proposed Rule 11. "The essence of the
equity jurisdiction," the Court has reminded us, "has been the power
of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has
distinguished it." 58 (2) A rule affording no discretion cannot, I believe, be justified as an exercise of "inherent power" of the sort to
which the Court was referring in Roadway Express. Such a rule
hardly bespeaks the "restraint and discretion" to which the Court in
that case referred.5 7 (3) Finally, in this aspect, section 1927 clearly
contemplates the exercise of discretion by the trial judge.58
The Advisory Committee's ambivalence on this score is obvious
in the Notes, which, in speaking of "explicitly encouraging the imposition of sanctions," 59 seem to me to toll the thirteenth hour. And,
again, I recognize that discretion is preserved as to the sanction that
will be imposed (as well as, inevitably, in the application of the standard to any given set of facts). But a lawyer concerned about adhering to the Code of Professional Responsibility and to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is unlikely to assume that, after so much
effort, the rulemakers have created a paper tiger. Moreover, my hopothetical lawyer cannot take much comfort from the picture of due
process in sanctioning painted by the Advisory Committee, ° which,
55. Thus, putatively mandatory language in FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4), (b) & (d) is
qualified by the identical clause, "unless the court finds that the [relevant behavior] was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." See also

FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c). Imposition of sanctions under FED. R. Civ. P. 37(g) is explicitly discretionary ("the court may, after opportunity for hearing, require
P. 56(g).
56. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
57. Supra text accompanying note 34.
58.

.

). But see FED. R. Civ.

See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 8.

59. Proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee note, SUPREME COURT REPORT,
supra note 1, at 58.
60. See proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note:

The procedure obviously must comport with due process requirements. The particular format to be followed should depend on the circumstances of the situation and
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although consistent with the austere landscape of Link v. Wabash
61 does not seem of one piece with the
Railroad,
Court's more recent
expression on the subject in Roadway Express,"2 or with Congress'
purpose in amending section 1927. We have apparently returned to
the view that "[t]o say that a law does not violatv the due process
clause, is to say the least possible good about it."6 That is hardly
the view the House and Senate managers took when, as reported by
one of them, they
strongly agreed that judges who utilize section 1927 sanctions must
make every effort to safeguard the rights of an attorney who may
be held in violation of that section. In so doing, it is imperative that
the court afford the attorney all appropriate protections of due
process available under the law."
We are not, in any event, confined to the evidence of history in
interpreting the Rules Enabling Act. The standards of rulemaking
the severity of the sanction under consideration. In many situations the judge's participation in the proceedings provides him with full knowledge of the relevant facts
and little further inquiry will be necessary.
To assure that the efficiencies achieved through more effective operation of the
pleading regimen will not be offset by the cost of satellite litigation over the imposition of sanctions, the court must to the extent possible limit the scope of sanction
proceedings to the record. Thus, discovery should be conducted only by leave of the
court, and then only in extraordinary circumstances.
SUPREME COURT REPORT,supra note 1, at 41. See also proposed FED.R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee note:
The sanctioning process must comport with due process requirements. The kind
of notice and hearing required will depend on the facts of the case and the severity
of the sanction being considered. To prevent the proliferaton of the sanction procedure and to avoid multiple hearings, discovery in any sanction proceeding normally
should be permitted only when it is clearly required by the interests of justice. In
most cases the court will be aware of the circumstances and only a brief hearing
should be necessary.
SUPREME COURT REPORT, supra note 1, at 60. Thus does fairness yield to the demands, as
well as the jargon, of efficiency, conviricing even one who is skeptical about the accuracy of the
picture drawn by Resnik, supra note 30, that the author has a point. This is "managerial
judging" with a vengeance. Note, moreover, that as recently as 1980, the rulemakers saw fit to
provide in the text of FED. R. Civ. P. 37(g) that a sanction might be imposed "after opportunity for hearing."
61. 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962).
62. "Like other sanctions, attorney's fees certainly should not be assessed lightly or
without fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record." 447 U.S. at 767 (footnote
omitted).
63. Cheatham, Conflict of Laws: Some Developments and Some Questions, 25 ARK. L.
REV. 9, 25 (1971).
64. 126 CONG. REC.H8047 (daily ed. Aug. 28, 1980) (statement of Rep. Mazzoli). See
also CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 8.
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allocation suggested by the pre-1934 history were formulated for another age and may not be adequate for the needs of the nation today. 5 Whereas much of the debate about these sanctioning provisions has concerned-and the Advisory Committee appears to have

painted a picture of due process with an eye to-the possible effect
of "satellite litigation" on judicial administration,"6 a procedural
concern, the concern identified by Congress in the legislative history
of the amendment of section 1927 is much more difficult to characterize. Consider the brouhaha about the privilege provisions in the

proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.

7

The Rules Enabling Act allocates lawmaking power. Where our
elected representatives have concluded that choices among standards
for imposing sanctions on attorneys implicate the effectiveness of
representation of clients, it seems to me a fair question whether
those choices should be made by the rulemakers or by Congress. 8
The question is more insistent when the trial judge's discretion is,

even if only formally, constrained. It should be obvious that I do not
regard the "laying before" provision of the Rules Enabling Act6 9 as

a substitute for, or as equivalent to, congressional action.7 ° In light
of Congress' unhappiness with that mechanism in recent years,7 1 and

of the concerns expressed in connection with section 1927, the point
may again become a moot one. If so, the blame lies with all of us for
continuing to fail to confront "the admittedly difficult business of
72
defining institutional limits in a federal democracy."

65. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1104-06, 1186-97.
66. See supra note 60.
67. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1974); 120 CONG. REc. 142021 (1974) (statement of Rep. Holtzman); id. at 2391-92.
68. Compare proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, SUPREME COURT
REPORT, supra note 1, at 39 ("The rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or
creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories.") with supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
The point, of course, is not that Congress' conclusion about the effect of sanctions on the
"legitimate zeal" of attorneys is correct or, indeed, that against the background of the proposed amendments, the concern should dominate in the lawmaking calculus. It is rather that
articulated public policy should not be ignored by the rulemakers.
69. "Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the
Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but not later than the first
day of May, and until the expiration of ninety days after they have been thus reported." 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
70. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1102, 1196.
71. See id. at 1018-20, 1196 n.779.
72. Id. at 1197.
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